







The Republic of Slovenia is a small country with an area of just 20.271 
square kilometres and one of the few on the Continent with a growing 
population (2.066.880 inhabitants, of which 15.0% under 15, and 19.4% 
over 65, on 1st January 2018). It lies at the heart of Europe, at the crossroad 
of four major European geographic regions, the Alps, the Dinarides, the 
Pannonian Plain, and the Mediterranean. Its immediate neighbours are 
Austria to the north is, Hungary to the east Hungary, Croatia to the south, 
and Italy to the west. The coastline is only 46.6 kilometres long, but there 
are 26,000 kilometres of rivers and streams, and around 7,500 fresh water 
springs, several hundred of them being first class therapeutic mineral 
springs. While the territory is relatively poor of mineral and energy 
resources (with some lignite, lead, zinc, building stone, and hydropower), 
forests cover half the territory which makes Slovenia the third most 
forested country in Europe, right after Finland and Sweden. This mostly 
hilly and mountainous country, with some 90% of the surface 200 metres 
or more above sea level, is rather unsuitable for agriculture, but an excellent 
place for tourism.  
The country has a fairly evenly distributed population. The rate of 
urbanisation (54.27%) is rather low by European standards. The capital 
city, Ljubljana, has got 280.000 inhabitants (2015). The next most populous 
city is Maribor (95.000), but the following ones, Celje and Krajn (each with 
38.000 inhabitants), are much less important. 
The main economic and political process in the country after 1990 was 
Slovenia’s threefold transition: “from socialism to a market economy, from 
a regional to a national economy, and from a part of SFR Yugoslavia to an 
independent state and member of the European Union” (Mrak et al. 2004: 
ix). This process, together with the three waves of privatisation which have 
been its essential element, fundamentally influenced business environment, 
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macroeconomic performance, as well as the quality of institutions and 
living conditions in the country. 
1. Political context and quality of institutions 
At the very beginning of transition, because of the inherited 
macroeconomic situation (of former Yugoslavia), characterized with a 
huge debt, hyperinflation and high level of imbalances in the economy, the 
tasks of macroeconomic stabilisation (and further internal and external 
liberalisation) mixed with the tasks of structural and institutional reforms 
(also the establishment of the missing institutions, such as a central bank 
and a national currency, customs systems, and a worldwide diplomatic 
network), privatisation of state-owned assets, reform of the enterprise and 
the financial sector, the public utilities, the pension and tax system, the 
social welfare system, and the public administration. 
The introduction of the new currency (tolár) in October 1991, happened at 
a time when the new central bank (Bank of Slovenia) faced a double-digit 
monthly inflation, a highly indexed economy, with no international 
reserves, and a huge legacy of nonperforming loans in large commercial 
banks. The central bank’s primary concern could not be but price stability. 
As annual inflation was reduced to single-digit levels by mid-1995, and 
foreign reserves increased from almost zero to the equivalent of 7.1 months 
of imports by the end of August 2003, the Slovenian central bank 
established itself as a credible institution. International respect for the 
country’s economic governance was further strengthened by a roughly 
balanced general budget and a fiscal environment conducive to foster 
growth. 
Ljubljana declared independence on 25th June 1991. Following a war 
against the Yugoslav army which lasted 10 days, the European Community 
acknowledged Slovenia as a sovereign state on 15th January 1992. Once 
the independence had been achieved, and following a two-year long 
transitional recession (aggravated by the rapid disintegration of 
Yugoslavia), Slovenia experienced an unprecedented period of unbroken 
economic growth that ran from 1993 until the outbreak of the 2008 crisis. 
These 16 years were marked by a gradual transformation from socialism to 




membership in all important international institutions (World Bank, IMF, 
UN, GATT, WTO, and OECD). Here, it is to be noted that the 
apportionment of the former Yugoslavia’s external debt served as a 
precondition for Slovenia’s full integration into the international financial 
system. The country entered both the EU and NATO in 2004. 
What were the fundamental causes behind these achievements? First, the 
legacy of the former SFR Yugoslavia. Slovenia inherited a strong tradition 
of a quasi-market system with relatively independent enterprise 
management structures running their firms which, in contrast to those in 
other planned economies, were directly exposed to some degree of 
competition. Second, Slovenia was by far the most developed and 
industrialised part of the SFR Yugoslavia. In 1990, its share in population, 
GDP and exports accounted for 8, 20 and 29% of the federation 
respectively. Its contribution to the federal budget amounted to 16.8%. 
Following independence, in terms of GDP, its deliveries to the federal 
budget declined from 7.2 in 1990 to 0.9 in 1991 (and then to zero) which 
meant an even greater relief than when the Czechs separated themselves 
from the less developed Slovakia in 1993 (Žídek 2016: 164). 
Finally and surely, what was the main driver behind the success story is 
gradualism. Just like the Yugoslav self-management system had been a sort 
of moderate version of socialist planned economy, with the business sector 
enjoying ample freedom in their investment, production and pricing 
decisions, similarly the independent Slovenia adopted the mildest possible 
version of capitalism, a Nordic-type market economy, with high degree of 
social cohesion and low levels of income inequality (the Gini coefficients, 
both before and after social transfers, are amongst the lowest in EU28.). 
The success of this socio-economic model, built on gradualism has largely 
contributed for this small country to become the fastest growing economy 
and the first new EU member to introduce the euro in the former Eastern 
Bloc. This strategy, which enabled it to build up the region’s most stable 
and efficient state institutions, made Slovenia the most Westernised post-
socialist country. In the early years of transition, it exhibited all the 
attributes of Western European small states mirrored in its economic 
openness, capitalist accumulation (of which high level outward FDI), 
“protective and efficiency-enhancing compensatory policies, 
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macroeconomic stability, and governance by established democratic and 
neocorporatist institutions” (Böhle and Greskovits 2012: 182). 
The success story is well reflected in Slovenia’s Human Development 
Index (HDI) value which, for 2017, was 0.896 placing the country 25th out 
of 189 countries and territories, following France, but ahead of Spain, 
Czechia or Italy. In the period of 1990-2017, Slovenia’s HDI value 
increased by 16.8%. Life expectancy at birth increased by 7.9 years, mean 
years of schooling by 1.3 years, and expected years of schooling by 5.2 
years. The country’s GNI per capita improved by about 61.8% between 
1990 and 2017. Since 2010, an approved indicator (IHDI) takes into 
account inequality in all three dimensions of the HDI by “discounting” each 
dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality. For this 
improved indicator (IHDI) Slovenia ranks even better than for HDI, and 
stood at 14th position (out of 151) in 2017, ahead of countries like Belgium, 
the UK, Austria, but also Singapore, Hong Kong, France, and the USA. 
It has to be noted, however, there are traditionally sharp dividing lines in 
this small country’s society between left and right, religious and irreligious, 
urban and rural, public and private (Szilágyiné 2019). Ever since the 
beginning of the transformation there has been a struggle between the new 
and the old elites. As long as the latter held their position firmly, the 
transition was gradual. From 2004 on, however, political power relations 
changed, and gradualism was halted. The result: severe banking crisis and 
double-dip recession in the economy. Although the country could avoid to 
be bailed out, but, under extreme pressure from both international markets 
and the EU institutions, it had to accept a growing interference by the latter 
in Slovenian post-crisis bank restructuring and economic governance, 
which resulted in decreasing democratic oversight of national banking 
policy: by “the hollowing out of democratic institutions, and strengthening 
of the executive, rule-based policy-making” the process narrowed fiscal 
democracy in Slovenian banking policy formation (Piroska and Podvršič 
2018: 32). 
The impact of the above processes has also been reflected in the quality of 
the institutions, which has not been very flattering for Slovenia. The 




indicators of six broad dimensions of governance, based on over 30 
underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of governance of a large 
number of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide.  
Indicators for Slovenia tend to show a rather disappointing picture. Three 
out of the six aggregate indicators have, throughout the whole period 1996-
2017, been continuously deteriorating: in 1996, 2004 and 2017 Slovenia 
ranked 26th, 33rd and 44th for “Voice and Accountability”, 15th, 35th and 49th 
for “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism”, and 31st, 47th 
and 59th for “Regulatory Quality”. In the case of “Control of Corruption”, 
the country’s position (35th, 35th and 44th) declined following the EU 
accession. It is to be added that, since 2013/2014, there was some recovery 
in ranking, save for “Regulatory Quality”.  The picture is different for both 
“Government Effectiveness” (39th, 42nd and 33rd position) and “Rule of 
Law” (31st, 43rd, 37th), as following a declining period until 2004, indicators 
improved afterwards. These improvements were probably due to the 
external pressure coming from both financial markets and the European 
Commission, especially from the early 2010s on, when Slovenia went 
through a very difficult period, and was almost in a position of having to 
ask for being bailed out by international institutions like some other 
Mediterranean countries did beforehand.   
2. General economic outlook 
After a two-year recession in 1991/1992 caused by the rapid disintegration 
of Yugoslavia, the independent Slovenia enjoyed a remarkably long era of 
uninterrupted economic growth between 1993 and 2008. In spite of having 
been one of the most advanced countries of Central East Europe at the 
beginning of the transition, Slovenia did better than any other fast-growing 
country of the region in catching up with the old EU member states. In the 
period of 1988-1990/2006-2008, it reduced its development gap vis-à-vis 
the EU15 by 13.9% in terms of real GDP per capita, more than Estonia 
(10.0 pp.), Poland (7.5 pp.) or Slovakia (4.8 pp.) did, all of them starting 
from much lower levels of development than Slovenia (ERS 2015). In the 
following period, the economy suffered a double-dip recession: in 2009, 
real GDP fell by 7.8%, which means that within the eurozone, Slovenia 
was the country most severely hit by the first wave of the global crisis. 
After a small recovery in 2010 and 2011, negative growth returned in 2012 
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(-2.5%) and 2013 (-1.0%). From 2014 on, however, the country has 
returned to steady growth. It took until early 2017 before GDP reached its 
pre-crisis level. 
 
GDP growth rates. 
 
 
Purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita in Slovenia stood at 79.8% of 
the EU28 average in 2000. In the year of the EU accession (2004) it was 
up to 85.8%, and the year of Slovenia’s entry into the eurozone (2007) 
87.0%. Things started to go wrong afterwards. At the height of the crisis 
(2013), the indicator deteriorated to 81.7%. Even if, by 2017, it climbed up 
to 85%, it was not only well below the level the country introduced the 
euro, but also below the level Slovenia entered the EU. Using Czechia, a 
country which have not introduced the euro yet, as a control panel, we can 
find the following data: 71.7% (2000), 78.2% (2004), 82.4% (2007), 83.6 
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As already mentioned, the economic situation has been improving since 
2014. The main driver behind this recovery was foreign demand, coupled 
with improved competitiveness of Slovenian exporters and their favourable 















































due to the restructuring of the banking system and the gradual fulfilment of 
fiscal commitments, which improved the country’s standing on financial 
markets, economic growth has become more broad-based. So, apart 
exports, remaining the most dynamic component of economic growth, 
domestic consumption has increased as well. Household consumption has 
been growing since the last quarter of 2013, stimulated by favourable 
labour market trends and high consumer confidence. Since 2017, gross 
fixed capital formation has also increased at a steadier pace, becoming the 
third main driving force of GDP growth. Investments in equipment and 
machinery have been growing since 2014, while from 2016 on, housing 
investments started to speed up as well, after having seriously (by circa 
60%) declined during the crisis. 
As a consequence, and as for the basic structure of GDP, Slovenia performs 
a relatively low share of public consumption (17.8 % in 2018, the EU28 
average being 20.0 %). This indicator started from comparatively low level 
before crisis, went up a bit over 20 % during the first years of the crisis, 
and is declining since 2012. The same holds true for private consumption, 
with a share of 50.8 % of GDP in 2018 (EU28 average being 55.5%), 51.1% 
in 2007, over 55% from 2010 to 2013, and declining since then. 
Investments topped just before the global crisis (29.6% in 2008), fell 
sharply during the next two years, slightly decreased/stagnated until 2016, 
and gained momentum since then. In 2018, GFCF stood at 19.7%, not much 
below the European average (20.5%).  The ratio of both exports and 
imports (of goods and services) to GDP has traditionally been very high, 
one of the highest in the EU. Leaving out 2009, a year when international 
trade dropped worldwide, both indicators have continuously been 
increasing throughout the whole period of 2007-2018. In 2018, imports 
stood at 75.7, while exports at 82.5% of GDP.  
The robust economic growth of recent years has also boosted the labour 
market. Despite positive developments (e.g. growing employment, falling 
unemployment, increasing activity rate), structural challenges remain. The 
working-age population is shrinking as a result of demographic change. 
This could hamper economic growth in the future. It also poses challenges 
to the sustainability and adequacy of the pension, health care and long-term 




workers, in particular those with lower levels of education. The tightening 
labour market is putting some upward pressure on wages, although wage 
growth remains somewhat lower than expected. In short, Slovenia faces 
some structural labour market weaknesses, notably a weak employment 
situation of low-skilled and older workers, as well as a mismatch of labour 
market needs and skills. 
In 2017, 7.7% of the Slovenian workforce was employed in the primary 
sector (agriculture, fishing, mining, forestry), 20.6 % in manufacturing, and 
the remaining 71.7 % in services. In 1995, the distribution of workforce 
displayed a different pattern: the above data were at a level of 15, 30 and 
55 % respectively. The decline in the share of both the primary and 
secondary sector, as well as the increase in the share of the tertiary sector 
have been gradual. But, it should be noted that the major part of this move 
was completed by the outbreak of the global financial crisis, and there has 
been very few changes since then. 
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Two other notable changes can also be observed in the structure of 
employment. First, both young and older workers saw their employment 
shares decline, especially in the early years of transition. The young ones 
faced more difficult access to jobs because of the tightened labour market, 
so making schooling at the college level became more attractive for them; 
while the old ones escaped unemployment through government-sponsored 
early retirement programs. Second, the educational structure of the 
employed improved greatly: the share of those unable to complete 
elementary school fell sharply, while the share of those with a high school 
education increased considerably. 
In 2017, the share of wages stood at 41.9% of GDP. Although it was a net 
(2.6%) decline vis-à-vis 1997, Slovenia ranked third (together with 
Germany) in the EU28, behind Denmark, and Luxembourg, but well above 
the European average. Trade union density tended to decrease throughout 
the 2013-2016 period, but remained relatively high in Slovenia, somewhere 
between 25 and 30 %. The union structure is fragmented, with seven 
separate union confederations, although one of them, ZSSS (Zveza 
svobodnih sindikatov Slovenije, Association of Free Trade Unions of 
Slovenia), being clearly dominant. In Slovenia, the activity rate has 
traditionally been higher than in Italy or Croatia, but lower than in Austria. 
In 2017, it was 74.2%, the best data since 2008, higher than both the EU28 
and EU15 average.  
Following a 5-year declining trend, Slovenia’s total unemployment rate 
decreased to 4.4% by March 2019, i.e. back to before crisis level, after 
having climbed to over 10% in 2013. In Slovenia, collective bargaining 
takes place at industry-level negotiations, setting pay and conditions for the 
vast majority of employees covered by bargaining. The ending of 
compulsory membership of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry for 
employers, and the 2006 Collective Agreements Act, which stated that only 
employers or employers’ associations with voluntary membership could 
sign collective agreements resulted in that many employers have chosen to 
withdraw from collective bargaining. The proportion of employees covered 
by collective bargaining has fallen from 96% in 2005 to an estimated 65% 
by ten years later. Temporary contracts have always been very common in 




Temporary employees’ rate for people aged 15 to 64 was 14.6% in 2017, 
of which young people aged 15 to 24 accounted for 71.6% of the contracts. 
Labour productivity progressed by 9% from 2010 to 2018, somewhat 
slower than in the V4 countries (except Hungary) or the Baltics, but much 
faster than most of the EU15, let along Italy. A comparison of global overall 
productivity in 2014 presented Slovenia as, by far, the most productive of 
the EU13 new countries. The share of Slovenian citizens of working age 
(20-64) living in another Member State increased from 2.4 to 3%, in the 
period of 2007-2017. While Slovenians are amongst the less mobile nations 
in the EU28, they rank first when it comes to the rate of employed of those 
living abroad (more than 80%). 
As far as the macro equilibria are concerned, both trade and current account 
balances are mostly positive since 2013/2014. A turning point in trend can, 
however, be observed lately, as a 300 million euro wage increase for the 
public sector, decided upon in December 2018, started to have an impact 





The general government balance has improved spectacularly in recent 
years. Deficit declined steadily after peaking in 2013 (at -14.7% of GDP). 
In 2017, Slovenia reached a slightly positive fiscal position (+0.1) due to 
improved macroeconomic circumstances following the stabilisation of the 
banking sector, the recovery of domestic and foreign confidence, and the 
measures implemented to increase revenue and restrain spending. Except 
for 2013, and to a lesser extent 2014, the years of bailing out banks, general 
deficit has always been in harmony with that of its neighbours (as well as 



















Following brisk growth until 2015, general government debt as a share of 
GDP did not start declining until 2016 and remains at a high level. General 
government debt surged from 2008 to 2015 (from 21.8 to 82.6% of GDP), 
but dropped since then to reach 73.6% in 2017. Factors behind this 
improvement include sustained economic growth, as well as an active debt 
management in favourable borrowing conditions. Nevertheless, debt 
remains high and restricts the fiscal space to cope with possible shocks, or 
ease austerity measures. General government expenditure has been 
declining since 2014, and in 2017 reached a level (43.2% of GDP) which 
was clearly lower than that of any of its neighbours. Inflation was gaining 
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(-0.5%) and 2016 (-0.1), it rose to 1.4% in 2017, and reached close to 2 % 
in 2018, especially due to higher oil prices. 
Despite the reforms of 2010-2014, stemming from austerity type crisis 
management, and the need for rescaling of Slovenian state regulations in 
line with the EU single market and eurozone constraints, social protection 
system remained complex, and consists of rights and services derived from 
various compulsory social insurance systems (old-age, disability, health, 
unemployment, professional disease) and a system of rights (benefits and 
services) which are tax-financed and categorical or mostly means-tested 
(protection of persons with disabilities, social assistance, child and family 
care). Reforms, starting in 2010, introduced means tested social transfers 
and subsidies, whereby allowances are attributed on the basis of income 
and wealth, in line with new welfare principles, meaning that benefits 
moved from being universal to targeted and conditional.  
3. Quality of entrepreneurship 
In former Yugoslavia, under the system of workers’ self-management, 
companies were operating in a quasi-market environment in relatively 
independent managerial structure, and had, to a certain degree, been 
exposed to competition. After the 1965 reform, which further liberalised 
the system, managers could feel themselves like quasi owners of the 
companies they managed. Despite inherent inefficiencies of the system (in 
the form of forced equalisation at both micro and macro level), the country 
progressed towards becoming a market economy: by the end of the 1980s, 
all prices and imports were liberalised. 
The process of privatisation of the corporate sector – at least at the level of 
principle – started already in the Yugoslav era. Amendments to the federal 
constitution, as well as some laws on economic and labour relations at the 
end of the 1980s (the Enterprise Act, the Law on the Circulation and 
Disposal of Social Capital, the Law on Social Property) (Mencinger 2006: 
5) – while limiting workers' self-management rights and allowing socially 
owned firms to transform into mixed companies – tried to find a solution 
to the problem of insolvency: bankruptcy rules were put in place, and 
companies in distress were allowed to include private capital to carry out 




The first wave of privatisation still bore the imprint of the socio-economic 
heritage of the preceding communist regime, the old elite having taken 
prominent part in it. This ensured a degree of continuity and resulted in 
balanced macroeconomic development. It was a mixture of free 
distribution, internal buyouts with discount and the possibility of deferred 
payment to employees, and commercial privatisation. In profitable small 
and medium-sized labour intensive firms (i.e. in more than 60% of the 
cases), workers and managers obtained majority ownership. The second 
most popular method for privatisation (in over 10% of the cases) was 
applied in profitable large firms – in fact too large for insiders to acquire a 
majority stake – where managers tried to maintain their influence by 
combining internal distribution of shares with public auction, thus opting 
for dispersed shareholder structure rather than strategic and/or institutional 
owners. At the end of the first wave of privatisation, which was followed 
by a non-transparent domestic consolidation of ownership, managers, 
domestic companies, and state and private funds were the key economic 
players. This model enabled the state to maintain significant ownership in 
privatised firms through state-controlled (pension and restitution) funds. 
Foreign and/or strategic investors played a much smaller (also less than 
desirable) role. 
Things began to go wrong during the second wave of privatisation. Due to 
political inexperience and internal division, the new elite lost the 1992 
election and the old elite governed the country for the following 12 years. 
When the new elite came back into power in 2004, the centre-right forces 
tried to take control of the economy and even large parts of the national 
media. In less than a year, they managed to put their faithful men into the 
managerial and supervisory boards in both government-related companies 
and state-owned banks, and, by forcing the latter to finance MBOs in the 
former, they exposed both banks and companies to extreme risks. By doing 
so, they also overheated the economy, especially in cyclically sensitive 
sectors like construction, real estate and financial mediation.  
Credit expansion was bolstered, first, by the country entering the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM-II) at the end of June 2004, whereby the 
Bank of Slovenia practically lost control of the amount of money in 
circulation; second, by the introduction of the International Financial 
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Reporting Standards (IFRS) in early 2005, replacing the previous 
conservative regulations with much more permissive ones; third, by 
growing competition among the banks, pushed especially by foreign banks 
who proved to be very aggressive in their efforts to expand their market 
share. Among factors on the supply side, undoubtedly the most important 
was the fourth one, i.e. the large supply of assets available on the 
international financial markets. In the period of 2004 to 2008, Slovenian 
banks borrowed massively from the interbank markets, and provided 
domestic companies with cheap loans.  
It was at the intersection of supply side (more financing) and demand side 
(more investment) that the problems leading all but to sovereign crisis 
concentrated:  
- the Slovenian banks faced increasing exposure to risks arising from 
a maturity mismatch (i.e. short-term liabilities outweighing short-term 
assets), as interbank credit had historically been short-term, whereas loans 
issued to the private sector were typically long-term; 
- a substantial part of the above mentioned loans financed the corrupt 
insider privatisations (i.e. consisted of soft funding for buyouts by 
politically connected managers); 
- the most dangerous was the very way in which the banks provided 
loans for this “conquest” (i.e. totally inconsistently with the principle of 
risk minimisation). On the one side, companies actively invested beyond 
their core business, and whereby created a real estate boom. On the other 
side, the banks, by letting an exceptionally high proportion of loans be tied 
to the value of properties which were pledged as collateral, exposed 
themselves to excessive risks. Also, they committed similar errors by 
financing companies carrying out leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) (Bank of 
Slovenia 2015: 20). 
This “conquest” attempted by the new elite came in the worst moment and 
played a crucial role in Slovenian economy having, since the outbreak of 
the global crisis, to suffer the Eurozone’s deepest slump. It was only after 
years of hesitation over the seriousness of the crisis, and several changes in 




in the form of encouraging speculation over a possible bailout, and the 
European institutions to introduce austerity policy, and comprehensive 
bank recovery measures, that the Slovenian economy came back from the 
brink. 
Here two remarks need to be made. First, although the economy has been 
put back on track in terms of growth, the recovery is still fragile, mostly 
driven by exports which in turn are fuelled by internal devaluation. This 
means that important strata of the population are far from enjoying any of 
the blessings of this recovery. Poverty is gaining ground especially in the 
countryside. The gradual weakening of labour bargaining power and its 
institutional capacities to impact on policy-making over major 
macroeconomic decisions accelerated in the post-2008 period. Second, 
although the country could avoid a direct intervention of the troika, the 
price to be paid was huge: the Slovenes were forced to give up their 
traditionally cautious attitude about privatisation and agreed to start a new 
program involving the sale of several of their nationally important entities.  
The third wave of privatisation included fifteen corporation from various 
sectors (of which some strategic such as banks, the national airways and 
airport). The process can be followed and checked on at the Slovenian 
Sovereign Holding (SSH) website. What immediately strikes the observer 
is that all closed transactions involved companies that passed into foreign 
hands. As far as the financial sector is concerned, in exchange for the ECB's 
approval to recapitalise the banks, the Slovenian government was forced to 
promise to privatise them: to fully privatise the second and third biggest 
banks (NKBM and Abanka), and partially privatise the first one (NLB). 
NKBM has already been sold to the US equity funds Apollo Management 
(80%) and EBRD (20%). Abanka has to be privatised by the end of 2019. 
As for NLB, 65% of its shares were sold at the end of 2018, in an initial 
public offering (IPO) process on Ljubljana and London Stock Exchange; 
the rest of the shares of up to 75% minus one share were to be sold by the 
end of 2019. The flip side of this process is that, apart from its already 
mentioned contribution to democracy deficit, the growing influence of the 
EU institutions on Slovenian banking policy “prolonged and deepened the 
banking crisis in Slovenia, contributed to a costly state rescue that boosted 
state debt and led to the privatisation of the key systemic bank which will 
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have a negative long-term effect on Slovenian fiscal balance” (Piroska and 
Podvršič 2018: 30). 
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) was established in order to 
measure the differences regarding the relationship towards 
entrepreneurship, uncover factors that encourage or hinder entrepreneurial 
activities, provide a platform for assessing the extent to which 
entrepreneurial activity influences economic growth, and reveal policy 
measures for the purpose of enhancing entrepreneurial capacity in an 
economy. In 2017, 34.6% of Slovenian adult population saw the possibility 
of future business opportunity, which ranked the country 40th globally and 
12th in Europe. The percentage has been on the rise during the last couple 
of years: in 2015 it only amounted to 20.5%. As for the self-perception 
potential, 53.3% of the population believed they had the required skills and 
knowledge for entrepreneurship, which ranked Slovenia 18th globally and 
1st among the European countries that participated in the survey. Successful 
entrepreneurs were also of great respect by Slovenian society, an opinion 
is shared by 73.4% of adults, which ranks Slovenia 5th in Europe. But, the 
percentage of people believing that entrepreneurship represents a good 
career choice (55.1%) ranked Slovenia in the middle of the European scale. 
Total early-stage entrepreneurial indicator (TEA) is one of the basic 
measures of GEM research, which measures the percentage of the adult 
population aged between 18 and 64 that are in the process of starting or 
who have just started a business venture. In 2017, Slovenian TEA reached 
6.85%, which was below the European average (8.07%). The next phase in 
the development of enterprises is the so-called established 
entrepreneurship, consisting of entrepreneurs who own businesses and 
have paid salaries for more than 42 months. In European context, Slovenia 
ranked 10th among 20 countries in 2017. Business discontinuation is the 
final stage of entrepreneurial process. In Slovenia, 17.2% of entrepreneurs 
discontinued a business, mostly due to lack of profitability, but also due to 
government/taxation policies or bureaucracy. Reflecting all the above, 
Slovenia’s 2017 GEM spider chart shows that expert ratings of the national 
entrepreneurial framework were in line with the European average, the 
level of physical infrastructure ranking highest, while entrepreneurial 




the lowest. The latter indicator, together with cultural and social norms 
were below European average. 
On the list of WEF’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) Slovenia scored 
35th out of 140 countries in 2018. This means a clear improvement from 
the 42nd position in 2008, mainly because of improved macroeconomic 
indicators (of which inflation and debt dynamics). The other main pillars 
of the GCI did not change spectacularly, and most of them were close to 
the level of the high income group average or the Europe-North-America 
average. Exceptions were the “market size” and the “financial system” 
indicators for which Slovenia ranked well below the control groups, and 
macroeconomic stability for which the opposite was true. Slovenia ranked 
among the best for the “cost of starting a business”, “macroeconomic 
stability”, “internal security” (“terrorism” and “homicide”), “railroad 
density”, “electrification rate”, “R&D expenditure”, “competition in 
services”, and some aspects of Pillar 6 (“skills”).   
4. Modernisation based on FDI 
In 2017/2018, according to statistics derived from the OECD database 
comparing inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) to GDP, there has been 
a clear difference between Slovenia (31%) and the other new member states 
of the EU, like the Visegrad (Poland 45%, Slovakia 54%, Hungary 57%, 
Czechia 64%) or the Baltic countries (Lithuania 37%, Latvia 50%, Estonia 
80%). It is, however, to be noted that Slovenia’s performance in this field 
is far from being unique either in the region – take e.g. Italy (21%) – or 
within the group of small European OECD countries, like Finland (35%), 
Iceland (34%) and Greece (16%)39. Nevertheless, the relatively low stock 
of IFDI indicates that the country could, at least until very recently, avoid 
to become a dependent market economy in the sense of TNCs controlling 
sectors of strategic importance. At the beginning of transition, the 
Slovenian economy was both more market-oriented and more 
internationally competitive – i.e. less in need of foreign capital to develop 
– than the V4 or the Baltics. Add to that the fresh new independence of a 
nation after centuries of subjection within ancient (Roman, Holly Roman, 
and Habsburg) empires or in Yugoslavia, and small wonder that the main 
                                                             
39 https://data.oecd.org/fdi/fdi-stocks.htm#indicator-chart  
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methods chosen for the first two waves of the privatisation process clearly 
benefited local managers and investment funds rather than foreign ones. 
For the latter, it was quasi a signal they were non-welcome in Slovenia 
(Vaupot 2018:9).     
Foreign direct investment (FDI), although traditionally low, has been 
increasing at a faster pace since 2014. FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP 
was 2.2 in 2017, fluctuating between 2 and 4% of GDP since 2014, up from 
between 0 and 1.7% for the previous 4 years. The favourable economic 
conditions in the international environment were not the only driver of this 
improvement. There were multiple domestic factors as well: the 
acceleration of privatisation; the improvement of the economic situation 
and business expectations; friendlier government attitude towards FDI; 
favourable labour market and cost trends compared to some competitors 
facing with labour shortage and rapidly growing labour costs. However, 
Slovenia is yet to improve certain key elements of the business 
environment, such as taxes and tax legislation, the length of administrative 
procedures, and labour legislation.  
At the end of 2017, there were twelve commercial banks, three savings 
banks and three branches of foreign banks (two from Austria, and one from 
France) operating in the Slovenian banking sector. Three out of five largest 
banks were partially state-owned: NLB with 25.6%, Abanka with 10.5%, 
and SID (a development bank) with 7.1% market share as measured by total 
assets. NLB and Abanka are under the state aid restructuring programme, 
and the government was committed to privatising them by the end of 2019. 
In 2016, on the list of Deloitte’s Central Europe (CE) Top 500 companies, 
there were 17 operating in Slovenia, so two more vis-à-vis 2015. As for 
their ownership situation, 6 out of them were in foreign hands, 2 belonged 
to the Slovenian state, while 9 were local companies. 
Measured by development indicators, the financial system still falls far 
short of the EU average. Banks’ total assets (as a percentage of GDP) are 
well below the EU average. The gap is narrowest in insurance, least 
affected by the financial crisis. The capital market remains poorly 
developed: treasury bonds account for the bulk of the market capitalisation 




stocks and their market capitalisation modest and lower than before the 
crisis. Stock market capitalisation amounted to 12.0% of GDP in 2017, on 
a stagnating/declining trend since 2009, very far away from the peak year 
of 2008 (39.1%). The level of domestic savings in relations to GDP started 
to increase after having reached the bottom at 22.9% of GDP in 2012. Their 
level of 28.9% (in 2017) was above those of its neighbours (except for 
Hungary).  
The situation in the banking system has improved significantly for the last 
few years, largely due to a sizeable bank recapitalisation at the end of 2013, 
and the transfer of a large share of non-performing loans from banks to the 
bad bank (BAMC). The quality of bank assets has improved strongly 
relative to 2013, and the favourable economic circumstances have 
contributed to an improvement in creditors’ ratings. Lending activity, 
however, is beginning to grow very slowly. Only in 2017 could it increase 
for the first time since 2010. Although loans to households grew for the 
third year in a row, but corporate loans increased for the first time in six 
years. Domestic credit to private sector was at 44.8% of GDP in 2017 (cp. 
85.3 in 2010), a much lower level than any of the V4 or its neighbours, 
except for Hungary (33.4), whose indicator performed a parallel path to 
that of Slovenia. Gross fixed capital formation, in terms of percentage of 
GDP, having felt from 27.3 (in 2000) or 24.3 (in 2009), then fluctuated 
significantly due to the dynamics of the drawing on the EU funds, started 
to increase in 2017 (18.5%). This level is very low compared to Slovenia’s 
neighbours or the V4 partners, with only Poland and Italy performing 
poorer. Bank concentration, measured in percentage of bank assets held by 
top 3 commercial banks, stood at 59.7%, with a minimum of 51.4% in 2013 
and a maximum of 65.2% in 2003 during the period of 1996-2016, and 
climbing again since 2013. 
5. Knowledge sector 
Education has always been high priority in Slovenia. Already in 1921, the 
rate of illiteracy was below 10% when no other region of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had it below 20, and the country average was 
above 50% (Gulyás 2009a: 6). Despite intense redistribution efforts, 
differences in development have not decreased in Tito’s Yugoslavia; in 
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1971, tiny Slovenia, with a mere 8% (but the highest-skilled and best-
educated people) of the population of Yugoslavia, produced 20% of the 
Federation’s GDP and accounted for 18.4% of its exports (Gulyás 2009b: 
163).  
Independent Slovenia started, in the 1990s, to establish a host of new 
institutions to promote innovation in the business sector: national agencies 
(TIA, ARRS, JAPTI)40, regional development agencies, new technology 
parks, and university incubators in Ljubljana, Maribor and Primorska 
(Breitfuss-Stanovnik 2007:6). Slovenia’s still highly diversified 
manufacturing sector accounted for more than 88% of BERD (Business 
Expenditures for Research and Development) in 2007. Best performer was 
the pharma industry (37%), whose much-appreciated brands (LEK, Krka) 
have got strong links with the universities of Ljubljana and Maribor, as well 
as the National Institute of Chemistry. Pharmaceutical and chemistry, car 
and car components, electrical industry and electronics, ICT, metal and 
machinery – which together with transport and logistics make the 
competitive backbone of the Slovenian industry – may all attribute their 
success to their close cooperation with the relevant faculties of universities, 
and other public research organisations of the country (OECD 2012: 
110,111). 
The annual European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) provides a comparative 
assessment of member states’ research and innovation performance, 
highlighting their relative strengths and weaknesses, and helping them to 
concentrate their efforts to boost innovation performance. In 2017, 
Slovenia, together with Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, 
belonged to the group of the so-called “strong innovators” with 
performance above or close to the EU average. The country stood 12th in 
the EU28, the same position as in 2010. Its performance relative to the 
EU28 average was 92.2%, a slight deterioration vis-à-vis 2010 (96.2%). 
Human resources and firm investments were the strongest innovation 
dimensions, finance and support, sales and employment impacts being the 
weakest. 
                                                             
40 Slovenian Technology Agency, Slovenian Research Agency, and Public Agency for 




Slovenia ranked 15th out of the EU28 Member States in the European 
Commission’s Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) in 2018. Since 
2015, it gained three places, leaving behind countries like Czechia, France 
and Portugal. Slovenia now belongs to the medium-performing cluster of 
countries consisting of, apart those mentioned, Spain, Austria, Malta, 
Lithuania, Germany, and Latvia. Although digital content is included in the 
formal education from elementary school to university level, and lifelong 
learning programs target parts of the population not covered by the formal 
education process (45+ years old, low-skilled and rural population), 
companies cannot find enough digitally skilled labour. Slovenes 
increasingly engage in online banking (50%), online shopping (57%), and 
read news online (77%). Slovenian SMEs are increasingly taking 
advantage of the possibilities offered by online commerce, 17.7% of them 
selling online, and 11.6% cross-border. Slovenia has considerably 
improved its performance in “Digital Public Services”, especially due to 
improvements in the re-use of public sector data, and in e-Health services. 
Digitisation contributes to transparency, as almost all documents for 
meetings of the government and parliament are available online, and 
several applications make it possible to monitor public procurement 
expenses, as well as the use of public funds. The high ranking in e-Health 
is explained by a generalised roll-out of e-prescriptions, enabling 
physicians to prescribe medicines to patients electronically. 
It is not for nothing that the country belongs to the group of strong 
innovator countries. People of research/innovation and education have 
always been highly appreciated members of Slovenian society. First 
scientific organisation (Academia Operosorum Labacensium) was founded 
in 1693 in Ljubljana. R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP was 1.85% 
in 2017, following stagnation from the late 1990s to 2007 (approximately 
1.3-1.5%), a steep growth from 2008 to 2013 (2.58%), and a decline since 
then. Since 1995, Slovenia’s R&D to GDP ratio has always been higher 
than that of its main regional partners (except for Austria), higher than the 
EU28 average in 2010-2016, and higher than the OECD average in 2011-
2014. In 2015, most of the R&D budget was spent on natural research 
(29.1%), engineering and technology (48.3), medical and health sciences 
(14.0), while much smaller part of them was devoted to social sciences 
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(3.7), or humanities and the arts (2.8). In 2017, and by sector of 
performance, 74.7% of the R&D expenditure was carried out in private 
businesses, 13.8% in government, 11.2% in higher education, and 0.3% in 
private non-profit institutions.  
The effects of the global economic crisis have largely been reflected in the 
adjustments of public budgets, also across all levels of education. Slovenia 
was among the countries with the largest negative adjustments: in 2015, 
public expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of was 4.3 
(4.1 without R&D), a 15% decrease vis-à-vis 2010, and 19% vis-à-vis 
2005. The higher education rate, i.e. the share of students in the 20-24 year-
old population, was 46.7% in 2016. 
6. Public opinion attitude towards transformations 
When we examine public opinion about transformation, we follow two 
main lines: first, one's attitude to the change of regime, and primarily to 
change in ownership (i.e. privatisation); second, people's attitudes to their 
country’s membership in the EU, as one of the most important factors in 
their daily lives.  
Slovenians are hard-working, economical peoples who worked also for the 
people of the other, poorer republics of Yugoslavia. Once independent, 
they sought security, i.e. their primary aim was to become member of the 
EU and NATO. But, they also wanted to maintain their control over their 
own country. Hence a certain degree of aversion to private capital, 
especially if it originates from abroad. It is generally believed that a 
particular area is best under government control. Entrepreneurs who move 
their capital abroad are treated as traitors. Unless they invest into the former 
Yugoslav republics, because these latter are being exploited by the 
Slovenians the same way as the West does with them: they export their 
capital and repatriate the profit, and also import the best manpower and 
employ at half price at home (Szilágyiné 2019). It is, therefore, no wonder 
that privatisation has always progressed slowly, and the privatisation of the 
most important (largest insurance and telecom) companies (Triglav and 
Telekom) was stopped for reasons of national security. Also, in the largest 




Regarding the public opinion about the country’s EU membership, there is 
a significant change in it since the time of gaining this membership. 
Support for the EU membership, which peaked at 57% in 2003, turned into 
52% of Slovenian respondents expressing distrust towards the European 
integration in 2015 (Kukovič and Haček 2016). We can add that the 
introduction of the euro, which seemed to be a good idea at the time, proved 
to be a rather bad idea: first, because, being much more appreciated than 
the tolar would be, it penalises the Slovenian exports; second, the Slovenian 
government had to borrow 250 million euro so as to pay its due part in the 
Greek rescue packages. And the risk that a similar event may happen in the 
future is not negligible. 
Conclusions  
Slovenia’s economic transformation from a socialist to a market economy 
went parallel with two other transitions: from a regional to a national 
economy, and from being a part of Yugoslavia to becoming an independent 
state. When observing the Slovenian way, we have to take into 
consideration some important facts: first, this new independent country was 
the most developed region not only in SFR Yugoslavia, but in the whole of 
Central and Eastern Europe; second, reforms started already under the 
former regime, and enterprises, operating in a quasi-market system, were 
exposed to some degree of competition; third, Slovenia inherited a unique 
enterprise ownership structure based on self-management, where workers 
exercised management functions; and finally, all three transition processes 
were undergoing in a period of intense social conflict. Having in mind all 
the above, we can identify three characteristic features: trade unions were 
very strong and organised labour shaped the trajectory of new Slovenian 
capitalism in many ways; gradualism had to prevail in all aspects of 
transition; foreign capital and intervention of any kind was not welcomed.  
Among the most important achievements, we can observe that Slovenia 
was able to distinguish itself as a new independent nation with a relatively 
stable economy and high living standard, also maintaining good quality 
public services available for the majority of people. This small country, 
contrary to most of the other transformation countries, has never had to ask 
for financial help from international institutions, introduced the euro first 
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among the new EU member states, and is among the strong innovator 
nations of the EU. Despite the changes related to EU and eurozone 
membership (e.g. the giving away of monetary policy), despite structural 
reforms and the partial downscaling of the welfare system, despite a 
restrictive fiscal policy gaining (also constitutional) grounds since mid-
2013, Slovenian neo-corporatist structures did in fact remain in place and 
social dialogue has not vanished. 
Short-term challenges facing the new government (in office since 
September 2018) include the need to finalise or get through with bank 
privatisation, and reform the public health and pension systems. Its plans 
for higher taxes and spending threaten to undo the fiscal consolidation 
measures taken by the previous government to ensure the long-term 
stability of public finances. Institutional weaknesses continue to undermine 
prospects for long-term economic development. In particular, the judicial 
system remains inefficient and vulnerable to political interference. 
Corruption continues to be perceived as widespread. 
Key long-term challenges are related to relatively low productivity growth, 
and as yet only slow adjustment to demographic change. High level of 
labour market segmentation of young people, and the relatively low 
economic and social inclusion of older people can also prove to be 
problematic. From the environmental point of view, high and rising GHG 
emissions from transport, the interrupted increase in the share of renewable 
energy sources and unsustainable use of land should be mentioned.  
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